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III.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING BELOW
The Plaintiffs below and appellees here, Lawrence M. Russell;
Russell/Packard Development, Inc.; Saratoga Springs Development, L.C.; Merlin Smith
and Margie Smith, filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §38-9-7 requesting the Court below to nullify the Notice of Interest filed by
Petitioners and Appellants as a wrongful lien pursuant to said statute. The Appellants,
John J. Thomas and PRP Development, L.C., objected to the request, requested a hearing
and at the hearing the Court summarily, pursuant to §38-9-7 nullified and terminated the
Notice of Interest filed by the Appellant. The District Court ruled from the bench, after
oral argument, on the 4th day of August, 1998. The order was entered on the 14th day of
August, 1998.
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j)
Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, because the appeal is from a final order of the
District Court, a court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original
appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Subsection (4) of the above-referenced Statute.
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IV.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether or not a Notice of Interest as authorized by Utah Code Annotated § 57-9-4
is a wrongful lien within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated §38-9-7 as ftirther defined
in §38-9-1(6) which states as follows:
" "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create
a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real
property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another
state or federal statute;
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or
judgment or a court of competent jurisdiction in
the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a
document signed by the owner of the real
property."
Because the proceeding upon which Petitioner went forth in the above-entitled matter is
a summary proceeding, the standard for appellate review is that of "correction of error"
and no deference is to be given to the trial Court's legal conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan,
788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989) ("Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment presents
for review conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not
resolve factual issues, this Court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without
according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions"). (Ibid) The standard of appellate
review then is that the appellate court must determine whether the trial court properly
found that a Notice of Interestfiledpursuant to Utah Code Annotated §57-9-4 and §57-9-5
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is a wrongful lien subject to summary relief within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated
§38-9-7.
V.
RULE
None
VI.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated §38-9-7, Utah Code Annotated §38-9-1(6), Utah Code
Annotated §57-9-4 and 57-9-5.
VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiffs/Appellees filed their petition requesting immediate summary
relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §38-9-7 arguing that the Claimants Notice of
Interest was a wrongful lien. (Transcript P. 5; Appendices 1) (ROA at - .) The
Appellants requested a hearing on the claims of the Plaintiff. At me hearing, upon
presentation of the evidence by Petitioner/Appellee, Defendant/Appellant argued that the
Notice of Interest was not a wrongful lien as required by Utah Code Annotated §38-9-1
in that a Notice of Interest was not a lien or encumbrance upon property and that Utah
Code Annotated § 57-9-4 expressly authorized the Notice of Interest. The Notice of
Interest was based upon a contract entered into by the parties which provided that
8
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Appellants were entitled to a trust deed upon the property in question upon closing of a
construction loan to be granted from Appellees. (Transcript P. 4-5; Appendices 2) The
Plaintiff/Appellee admitted in his moving papers that he had not provided the trust deed
as required by the contract.
VIII.
RELEVANT FACTS
The Appellants and Appellees entered into a Purchase and Development Agreement
dated April 2, 1997 which provided for payment to PRP of approximately $528,000 to be
paid with closings from 66 lots located in the Saratoga Springs Subdivision Phase I, located
in Utah County, State of Utah. (Transcript P. 4-5; Appendices 2) (See Memorandum in
Support of Petition to Clear Title filed by the Plaintiff) The Purchase and Development
Agreement provided at paragraph 2c that the amounts owed PRP were to be secured by trust
deeds and trust deed notes to be recorded after the closing of the construction loan with
American Legal Title. (Ibid)
The trust deeds and trust deed notes were never executed by the Appellee, nor were
they recorded. (See Transcript P. 5) The Appellants recorded a Notice of Interest on the 22nd
day of June, 1998, referring to the Purchase and Development Agreement, that it was entitled
to a trust deed, upon the lots. (See Plaintiffs Petition and Appendices No. 3).
The Plaintiff/Appellee filed its Petition pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §38-9-7 to
nullify the Notice of Interest as a wrongful lien within the meaning of that statute. The Court

9
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at the hearing determined that a Notice of Interest is an encumbrance upon title, was not
otherwise authorized by statute and that it was a wrongful lien within the definition of § 389-1, Utah Code Annotated, and ordered the lien to be nullified. (See Transcript P. 13-17).
X.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the bringing of an action for nullification of a wrongful lien, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §38-9-7, the Appellees made the assumption that the Notice of Interest was
a wrongful lien in the sense that it was an encumbrance within the meaning of the statute and
not otherwise expressly authorized by State or Federal statute. In fact, the law is clear that
a Notice of Interest is not an encumbrance upon property, and in fact, even if it were an
encumbrance upon property, is expressly authorized by Utah Code Annotated § 57-9-4. The
Court's decision to include a Notice of Interest within the wrongful hen statute and make its
determination available in summary proceedings, has the plain effect of making the filing of
a Notice of Interest, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §57-9-4, a nullity.
XI.
ARGUMENT
A.

The trial court committed an error of law when it concluded that the
Notice of Interest was a lien or encumbrance within the meaning of
Utah Code Annotated §38-9-1 or that the Notice of Interest was not
otherwise expressly authorized by State or Federal statute.

The case is one of first impression before this Court to construe Utah Code Annotated
§38-9-7. That statute permits a District Court to grant summary relief to nullify a lien if it
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is a wrongful lien, as defined in §38-9-1. Wrongful lien is defined in §38-9-1(6) as follows:
" "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create
a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real
property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another
state or federal statute;
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or
judgment or a court of competent jurisdiction in
the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a
document signed by the owner of the real
property."
The matter before the Court is simple, straight forward, and direct.

Did the

legislature, by passing Utah Code Annotated §38-9-7 and §38-9-1, intend to permit
summary disposition of a Notice of Interest which is also specifically authorized by statute?
In the matter ofCommercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard, 936P.2ndll05,

UTCtApp

1997 the Court of Appeals construed the predecessor of §38-9-1 which is now §38-9-4 of
Utah Code Annotated (1997).

In that case the Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict

finding that a Notice of Interest was not groundless as required by statute. Since the Court
of Appeals decided Commercial Investment v. Siggard, §38-9-1 was amended to that as set
forth above. The statute, in Subsection 6(a), specifically states that a document is not a
wrongful lien if it is expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute.
Because §57-9-4

expressly provides for a Notice of Interest it cannot, under any

circumstances, be in violation of §38-9-1.
Furthermore, even if this Court were to use the analysis set out by the Court of Appeal
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in Commercial Investment Corp. Ibid the District Court did not determine that the Notice of
Interest was groundless. In fact, the Court specifically stated in all likelihood the grounds
for the Notice of Interest were not without merit, inasmuch as the Court directed the
Respondent to file a lawsuit and file a Lis Pendens upon the property in question. In doing
so the District Court has deprived the Appellant/Respondent of its right to file statutory
Notice of Interest as set forth in the statute.
This Court can also take direction from Commercial Investment Corp., ibid, in that
the issue of the validity of the Notice of Interest was submitted to a Jury. In that case the
result of a wrongful lien would have been enhanced damages.
X.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the facts and the record, it is absolutely clear that the Notice of Interest
filed by the Appellant/Defendant is not a wrongful lien as set out in §38-9-1(6) and
Plaitniffj/Appellee was not entitled to a summary relief as provided in §38-9-7, Utah Code
Annotated. As a result, the District Court's decision should be reversed.
DATED t h i s i S a y of July, 1999.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Davta^Black
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE
Attorneys for Appellants
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APPENDIX

1.

Transcript - July 9, 1998

2.

Objection to Petition to Clear Title

3.

Memorandum in Support of Petition To Clear Title
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, THE STATE OF UTAH

LAWRENCE RUSSELL,
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)
)
Case No. 980404802
Appellate No. 981615-CA

VS.

JOHN J. THOMAS,
Defendant.

)
)

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
July 9, 1998
BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE GARY P. STOTT
Fourth District Court Judge

For the Plaintiff:

Michael R. Carlston
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)521-9000

For the Respondent:

David O. Black
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE
7069 S. Highland Dr.
Suite 250
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Telephone: (801)484-3017

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT
1641 SOUTH 350 WEST
OREM, UTAH 84058
TELEPHONE: (801)225-0234
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on July 9, 1998)

3
4

THE COURT:

is that of Lawrence Russell vs. John J. Thomas.

5
6

First matter for this afternoon

MR. BLACK:

I'm David Black, I'm

representing the defendant, John Thomas of TRT.

7

THE COURT:

Anyone here on behalf of the

8

plaintiff?

As I've read through the file it looks

9

like you've got a request to declare the lien that's

10

being claimed as unlawful and asking that that be

11

removed; is that correct?

12

MR. BLACK:

That's what we're requesting.

13

THE COURT:

Have you heard from anyone from

14

the plaintiff with respect to this hearing today?

15

MR. BLACK:

I have not, your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

You're resisting his request?

17

MR. RUSSELL:

18

THE COURT:

20

MR. CARLSTON:

22

I'll be happy to tell

you why.

19

21

I am.

We'll wait.
Your Honor, I'm Michael

Carlston, I apologize for being late.
THE COURT:

Mr. Carlston, we are here with

23

respect to the request for a hearing that's been filed

24

by you concerning your request as to the objectionable

25

lien. Are you ready to proceed, sir?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3

MR. CARLSTON:

Thank you.

Your Honor, I

represent the petitioner, and in this case there has
been a cloud filed on a title, a copy of the notice of
interest is attached to our moving papers as Exhibit
No. 5.

I have a notice of interest.

The petitioners

are either Mr. Russell and his company that's
developing the lots where these are found, or the
parties having interest in such lots.
We seek a ruling based upon uncontroverted
evidence that this filing of notice of interest is a
wrongful lien pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section
38-9-1, and that these liens be removed.
There is, as the Court knows, a perfectly
appropriate procedure that can be followed if one has
a claim of interest in property, and that would be to
institutue a legal proceeding, and thus proceed to
file a lis pendens.
To give the Court a little background on the
origin of this, the respondent was at one time in
business with Mr. Russell and they have an independent
agreement relating to some payments on some of these
lots.

There is a dispute concerning those payments

that stems from the fact that the respondents did not
pay the costs of the businesses that were formerly
held together.
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1

The petition of Mr. Russell, having signed

2

some of the guarantees in that, has been obligated to

3

date to pay over $120,000 to settle those.

4

that reason, he has not consented to the respondents

5

filing a security interest on the lots in question.

6

So for

So rather than (inaudible) them filing a

7

lawsuit and giving us a chance to do it by the

8

statutory rules, they've just filed their notice of

9

interest which is not an appropriate way to proceed.

10

We are here requesting that that be eliminated and

11

that if they do feel that they have an interest that

12

they assert it in the appropriate way where a title

13

company can evaluate it, let's say, and allow Mr.

14

Russell to bond around it while the proceedings go on

15

or not by virtue of the complaints that would be filed

16

and the notice of lis pendens.

17

I believe, your Honor, that the documents

18

that are attached clearly explain and are supportive

19

of the relief that's requested.

20

THE COURT: Thank you.

21

Mr. Black?

22

MR. BLACK:

Thank you, your Honor.

A few

23

more facts I think might help the Court in looking at

24

where we're at.

25

from an entity known as CNT. They bought them on a

Originally TRT bought about 72 lots
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1

uniform real estate contract that was between CNT as

2

sellers and TRT as buyers (inaudible) my client.

3

CNT is not a party to this action.

They are

4

the ones that actually own the property that --we

5

purchased it from them and much of it has not been

6

taken down.

7

were take downs that were supposed to happen over a

8

period of time.

9

happened.

Now under that real estate contract there

Some have happened and some haven't

10

At a certain point TRT sold or assigned an

11

interest in the lots to Lawrence Russell, one of the

12

petitioners here.

13

notice of interest, along with the real estate

14

contract.

15

both attached to the notice of interest.

16

That assignment is attached to our

So the two contracts of TRT as a party are

If the Court will take a close look at the

17

notice of interest all it says is we have an , •

18

interest as defined in both of those documents, the

19

real estate contract and the purchase contract between

20

TRT and Lawrence Russell.

21

Now the purchase contract --in the purchase

22

contract Russell agreed to pay TRT $528,000 in

23

paragraph 2.

24

contract, Russell agrees to give TRT a trust deed of

25

$8,000 each time Russell takes down one of the lots

In paragraph 2(c) of the purchase
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under the underlying purchase contract that was
assigned to him.
We've asked Russell to do that, he hasn't
done it, and simply speaking, because he hasn't done
it, we don't know where they're at.
Now TRT has an interest in the real estate
contract if the underlying lots, when they are taken
down by Mr. Russell, and that interest is on CNT, and
they have to be the petitioner to complain about our
notice of interest with regard to that interest.
With regard to what's statutory and what's
not statutory, I think counsel has misread the
statute.

38-9-7 permits this Court to summarily void

a lien or incumbrance -- actually, the statute doesn't
talk about lien or incumbrance, it talks about
wrongful liens, and then it refers back to 38-9-1 that
talks about a definition of what a wrongful lien is.
And under 38-9-1 a wrongful lien is first
described as is it a lien or is it an incumbrance?

I

submit that a lien or incumbrance is not a notice of
interest that is provided for by statute.

In fact, a

notice of interest is a statutory creature that is
provided for by 57-9-4 where the statute specifically
authorizes that.
THE COURT:

Let me interrupt you.
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If you

look at definition No. 2, doesn't that make your
clients the last phrase in that paragraph, or other
claim of interest in real property?
claimant.

You've got a lien

It defines a lien claimant to be-MR. BLACK:

Are you looking at definition

No. 2?
THE COURT: That's right.
MR. BLACK:

Okay.

THE COURT:

Your client is a lien claimant

by way of what's been filed here. Aren't they the "or
other claim of interest" in real property?
MR. BLACK:

I think under that statute, if

they have another claim of interest, they are a lien
claimant, but that's not what the statute is focusing
on.

If you look at where they're entitled to summary

disposition, it simply states where there's a wrongful
lien, so you then have to go and look at what a
wrongful lien is, and a wrongful lien is either a lien
or an incumbrance.

There is no case law in the State

of Utah that says (inaudible) notice of interest is
either a lien or an incumbrance.
As a matter of fact, it's akin to a lis
pendens.

In Hansen v. Roller -- let's see if I have

the cite here. The Utah Supreme Court specifically
held -- that's at 550 P.2d 186 -- the Utah Supreme
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

Court specifically held that's just constructive

2

notice if somebody claims an interest in the property

3

through the litigation, that is not an incumbrance.

4
5

That's the same as a notice of interest, and
if the Court will look at the section--

6
7
8
9
10
11

MR. CARLSTON:
is that?

What page in Hansen v. Roller

I've got the case here.
MR. BLACK:

It's about halfway through it,

it's a fairly (inaudible) case (inaudible) that
conversation.
The statute says (inaudible) wrongful lien

12

claimant as defined by, and then it refers us to lien

13

claims, wrongful liens.

14

incumbrance?

15

Is it a lien or is it an

I submit that if the legislature had

16

intended that it be a notice of interest they could

17

have said a lien, an incumbrance or a notice of

18

interest, but they didn't say that.

19

proceeding is entitled to a summary process, they are

20

entitled to it if and only if it's a lien or if it's

21

an incumbrance.

22

They said if this

Then we go onto the next step, they don't

23

even -- even if they had complied with that aspect of

24

the law, which they haven't -- an remember, this is an

25

extraordinary remedy under the statute.
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The next step

is the wrongful lien has to be -- unless it's
expressly authorized by this chapter or another state
or federal statute.

57-9-4 is what they were talking

about.
This is authorized by 57-9-4 which states,
"Any person claiming an interest in land they preserve
and keep effective such interest by filing for a
record during the 40 year period immediately following
the respective date of writ of title (inaudible) the
record title would otherwise be marked (inaudible),"
and then it tells you how to do the notice of
interest, which we have done.
So even if they can argue ignoring all of
the laws that this is a lien or an incumbrance, this
statute that I just cited authorizes it. The next
section, 57-9-5 sets out how you file a notice of
interest, which we have complied with completely and
fully.
Now even if we hadn't complied with that,
even if we hadn't complied with that, at subsection
(c) -- and these are under disjunctive, (a), (b) and
(c) are the disjunctive -- unless it's signed by or
authorized pursuant to the document signed by the
owners of real property.
So the question is it's a also wrongful lien
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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if -- it could be a wrongful lien if it's not
authorized by statute if the parties haven't signed
it.
We are here today because my client sold
property to Mr. Russell, Mr. Russell agreed that he
would put trust deeds on the property.

He hasn't done

it once, not one single time. We don't know how much
property has been sold or how much property hasn't
been sold, and I would -- I don't care if I have a
notice of interest even, I would be happy to do what
we thought the agreement said, have all (inaudible)
title company and say you can't take this down unless
you do what you promised to do.
But my client secured $528,000, Mr. Russell
agreed to put a trust deed on the property, he has
failed to do it, and we exercised an appropriate
statutory right.

It has nothing to do with the

summary proceeding that's before this Court today.
Unless the Court has any questions, I'll sit down.
THE COURT:

I'll hear from you, Mr.

Carlston.
MR. CARLSTON:

We simply disagree on the

statutory construction of a wrongful lien.
THE COURT:

What is a wrongful lien?

MR. CARLSTON:

A wrongful lien means any
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

document that purports to create a lien or incumbrance
on an owner's interest in real property, and at the
time it's recorded and filed, and I want to stop there
for a minute.
I thought I heard Mr. Black suggest that
this wasn't a lien or an incumbrance, and I believe
under all of the laws that I know it is a lien or
incumbrance if it clouds or has any effect on the
title.
So then the --it being a lien or an
incumbrance affecting the real property, then the
question is is if it falls into one of the exceptions,
that is is it expressly authorized by this chapter or
another statute.
Mr. Black said that --he argues that it's
authorized by his statute and that the contract is
then a contractual right to a deed of trust.

That

doesn't authorize the filing of the lien, that's at a
minimum to them is a breach of contract action.
He then argues that it's authorized by
57-9-4 dealing with how you preserve the writ of
title.

That's not an argument that they've made in

their papers until today, and actually (inaudible)
concept on his head.
It's not authorized either --he points to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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two arguments that this is not -- that a notice of
interest is authorized, and there is no support in the
law or in the statutes for either of these.

A

wrongful lien is one that (inaudible) authorized by an
order or judgment of the Court.

There's no such thing

here.
It's fascinating in hearing them say that
this is akin to a lis pendens, and then he cites the
Hansen vs. Roller case.

The Hansen vs. Roller case

actually says that the sole purpose -- this is at page
190, your Honor.

The sole purpose of recording a

notice of lis pendens is to give constructive notice
of the pendency of the proceeding.

Its only

foundation is the action filed, it has no existence
independent of it.
I submit, your Honor, that it is a wrongful
lien, that we proceeded properly under the appropriate
statute to have it removed.

This is not really a

serious setback for Mr. Thomas and PRP.

If they feel

they have an interest and they desire to assert it,
there would be a well established procedure in this
case to do it simply by filing a lawsuit and filing a
lis pendens to go with it.
The disadvantage that my client has under
these circumstances is that -- you know, despite Mr.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Black's suggestion that they attached certain papers

2

to the notice of interest, we are unable to ascertain

3

and pin this down exactly as to the claim made for

4

purposes of either evaluating it with the title

5

company or taking other action.

6

I believe that's what litigation does, and

7

it's a little puzzling to me to see them use this

8

action rather than go through the front door.

9

just asking them to go through the front door, we're

10

not asking them to abandon any claims they may have.

11

This isn't the appropriate place or time to decide the

12

merits of what Mr. Russell says the situation is

13

versus what Mr. Thomas says it is. We acknowledge

14

that and (inaudible) to see that happen in a more

15

appropriate setting.

16

We're

We would respectfully request that the Court

17

cause the notice of interest to be discharged under

18

the applicable statutory position.

19

THE COURT:

Thank you. The material found

20

in the file and the arguments that counsel have

21

presented, Mr. Carlston I ask that you prepare the

22

order.

23

This Court is going to find that the notice

24

of interest that has been filed is an incumbrance on

25

the property, therefore subject to the petition that's
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been filed and the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
as requested.
If there is a problem with respect to Mr.
Black's client's interest in the land, the subject of
the notice of interest, you have a remedy of pursuing
things by way of litigation of a breach of contract
action or whatever that may be with those folks, but I
don't think that the request that the plaintiff has
made is inappropriate based upon the statute as I read
it, and I find that it's an incumbrance on the
property.
MR. BLACK:

Is the Court finding that this

is not otherwise authorized by statute as set out in
subparagraph (inaudible)?
THE COURT:

Correct.

57-9-4 sets forth a

procedure whereby a notice of lien may be filed - - a
notice of interest may be filed.

It sets forth a

process for which it can be established, but I don't
find that it is an exception to that which you argue
here today.
MR. BLACK:

Your Honor, could I--

THE COURT:

And I would like that in the

finding as well.
MR. BLACK:

I appreciate that.

Your Honor,

may I make a motion to stay this until one of two
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1

things happen?

2

appeal it, and if the Court would consider staying it

3

because you're forcing my client to waive rights that

4

the statute clearly permits him to have, .and we would

5

like to appeal that on an expedited basis.

6

Actually we would like to immediately

THE COURT:

7

with your appeal.

8

interlocutory appeal.

9

Well, I don't have any problem

See if they'll take it on an

MR. BLACK:

And I'm not -- because it's a

10

summary process I think it would be an interlocutory

11

appeal, but what I am saying is I'm asking the Court

12

to stay its nullification of the lien that's clearly

13

called for by statute.

14

coming from, but I think that there is significant

15

room to disagree with the Court's conclusion because

16

this Court is specifically saying that the legislature

17

didn't mean what it said when it passed the notice of

18

interest statute.

I understand where the Court's

19

So all I'm saying is if the Court will stay

20

that until we can appeal it, I think it would be fair

21

for everybody.

22
23
24
25

THE COURT: Mr. Carlston, do you have any
objection to it?
MR. CARLSTON:

Well, your Honor, Mr. Black

thinks through the back door he can get what he can't
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1

get through the front door.

2

for approving and preparing an order which would give

3

them plenty of time to appeal, if they wish to do so.

4
5
6

THE COURT:

We have a process here

Why isn't that process

appropriate for your client, Mr. Black?
MR. BLACK:

Because if you get rid of the

7

lien right now it is gone, and my client has lost --

8

these people are conveying property in breach of a

9

contract that this Court has before it, and it's

10

ignoring the contract, and this Court is saying in a

11

society that everybody says there's too much

12

litigation, you have to go sue to protect your

13

interest when the legislature already said this is how

14

you protect your interest.

15

client has a right to protect his interest.

16
17
18
19
20

THE COURT:

All I'm saying is my

File your breach of contract,

file your lis pendens and serve Mr. Russell.
MR. BLACK:

Well, I understand that, but

what I'm saying is I think we're entitled to know
(inaudible) interest as well, and what I'm saying is

21

with all due respect I'm just asking this Court to

22

permit us to appeal that without you effecting the

23

rights of the parties.

24
25

THE COURT:

You have the statutory right of

appeal, I'm going to sign the order.
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1
2

MR. BLACK:

And you're denying my request

for a stay?

3

THE COURT: Correct.

4

MR. BLACK:

5

Okay.

(Hearing concluded)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF UTAH

I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the
State of Utah, do hereby certify:
That the foregoing proceedings were transcribed
under my direction from the electronic tape recording
made of these proceedings.
That this transcript is full, true, and correct
and contains all of the evidence, all of the
objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court and all
matters to which the same relate which were audible
through said tape recording.
I further certify that I am not interested in the
outcome thereof.
That certain parties were not identified in the
record, and therefore the name associated with the
statement may not be the correct name as to the
speaker.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 16th day of
March 1999.
My commission expires:
February 24, 20 0 0
^

NOTARY PUBLIC
residing in Utah County

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•*

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DAVID O. BLACK, #0346
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE, P.C.
1245 E. Brickyard Road, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 484-3017
Facsimile:
(801) 484-3094
Attorney for Respondents

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF UTAH
LAWRENCE M. RUSSELL;
RUSSELL/PACKARD DEVELOPMENT,
INC.; SARATOGA SPRINGS
DEVELOPMENT, L.C.; MERLIN SMITH
and MARGIE SMITH,
Petitioners,
vs.

)
)

OBJECTION TO PETITION
TO CLEAR TITLE

I

Case No. 9804-4802

)

Judge: Stott

)'

JOHN J. THOMAS and PRP
DEVELOPMENT, L.C.,

i

)

Respondents.
The respondents, John J. Thomas and PRP Development, L.C., hereby object to
Petitioners Petition to Clear Title and Memorandum in Support thereof. The Petitioners have
requested this court enter an order voiding the Notice of Interest prior to hearing in direct
contravention of 38-9-7 as cited by the Petitioners.
The Petitioners also object to the sufficiency of the Petition inasmuch as a Notice of
Claim is not a wrongful lien within the meaning of 39-1-7 (6), inasmuch as the Notice of
Claim does not create a lien, nor is it an encumbrance upon title. The Notice of Claim is
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nothing more than a notice to the world that respondents are entitled to trust deeds upon the
property pursuant to agreement between the parties. In the event the court determines the
Petition is sufficient to award a hearing, the respondents hereby request a hearing pursuant to
39-1-7.
DATED this Xjk day of July, 1998.
BLAC^,^fnTH & ARGYLE, P.C.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby certify that on t h e J ^ _ day of July, 1998, I caused a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing Objection to Petition to Clear Title to be delivered, via first
class mail, postage prepaid in an envelope addressed to the following named person(s):
Michael R. Carlston
!•
Scott Keith Wilson
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MART1NEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

LA^xi,^

y J/Ax^w/i\
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MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577)
SCOTT KEITH WILSON (A7347)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Petitioners
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LAWRENCE M. RUSSELL;
RUSSELL/PACKARD DEVELOPMENT,
INC.; SARATOGA SPRINGS
DEVELOPMENT, L.C; MERLIN SMITH
and MARGIE SMITH,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION TO CLEAR TITLE

Petitioners,
Case No.

9?OV- VffO <2

vs.
JOHN J. THOMAS and PRP
DEVELOPMENT, L.C,

,
Judge

<rhoJ(

Respondents.

INTRODUCTION
This Petition has been filed to challenge defendants' recording of a "Notice of Claim"
as to properties owned by or under a contract of sale to petitioners. Respondents have no
legitimate legal claim to an interest in these properties, and no contractual or other legal right
to file a so-called "Notice of Interest." By this petition, plaintiffs seek a ruling that the filing
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of the Notice of Interest is a wrongful lien pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1, and request
an expedited hearing on this matter within ten days, and an immediate order nullifying this
wrongful lien, as provided by Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On February 21, 1994, Respondent PRP Development, L.C. (PRP)1 was

formed in order to develop residential property. Its members were Russell/Packard
Development, Inc., and Premier Homes, L.C, which is owned and operated by Respondent
John Thomas. See Articles of Organization, attached as Exhibit 1.
2.

In November 1996, PRP contracted to purchase 72 townhouse lots in the

Saratoga Springs Phase I, located in Lehi, Utah, from C.M.T. Investments, who made the sale
on behalf of the property owners, Saratoga Springs Development, L.C. The purchase contract
provided that the individual lots would be closed according to an established schedule. See
Real Estate Purchase Contract, attached as Exhibit 2.
3-

On April 2, 1997, Larry Russell, on behalf of Russell/Packard, and Premier

Homes, as the members of PRP, entered into a Purchase and Development Agreement which
provided that Russell/Packard would sell its share of PRP to Premier for $5,000.00, and
would acquire PRP's interest in the Purchase Contract for the 72 Saratoga Springs townhouse
lots. See Purchase and Development Agreement, 111-2, attached as Exhibit 3.

1

The original name of this L.C. was Premier-Russell/Packard, L.C, but the name was
later formally changed to PRP Development, L.C.
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4.

The Purchase and Development Agreement provided that Russell would pay a

total of $528,000.00 for the Saratoga Springs properties, to be paid in the future as the lots
were sold. Specifically, Russell agreed to pay to PRP $8,000.00 per lot at the time of the
closing of each of the last of the 66 lots to be sold. Accordingly, Russell could sell the first 6
lots in the development without making any payment to PRP. Id., \2.
5.

The Purchase and Development Agreement further provides that "the amounts

due PRP shall be secured by a standard trust deed and trust deed note in favor of PRP to be
recorded after the closing of the construction loan and/or an escrow arrangement at American
Legal Title, acceptable to PRP, which arrangement provides for the payment of $8,000 to PRP
upon the sale of each lot." Id., 12(c). Thus, the Purchase and Development agreement
authorizes only that a trust deed for $8,000 may be recorded on properties owned by
Russell/Packard following the closing of a construction loan.
6.

After Russell and Russell/Packard had ceased their association with PRP, PRP

failed to meet certain of its obligations, including payments on a construction loan, payments
for construction materials provided to PRP projects, and lease payments on a truck.
7.

Pursuant to the terms of a Letter Agreement dated March 2, 1998, Russell

agreed to pay these debts owed by PRP. John Thomas personally, and on behalf of PRP
Development, acknowledged such debts, and agreed that $110,173.45 would be deducted from
the total amount to be paid to PRP under the terms of the Purchase and Development
Agreement, and that no payments would be made to PRP until the $110,173.45 plus interest
had been fully set off against the amounts owed by Russell under the Purchase and
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Development Agreement. If divided into $8,000 increments, this Letter Agreement thus
provided that Russell is not obligated to make payments for the Saratoga Springs properties
until an additional 13-14 properties in the development had been sold, depending upon the
amount of interest accrued. In addition, the Letter Agreement provides that there is no waiver
of possible additional claims to be made by Russell which could also require a set-off of
additional amounts otherwise owing under the Purchase and Development Agreement2. See
Letter Agreement, Exhibit 4.
8.

Accordingly, pursuant to the terms of the Purchase and Development

Agreement and the Letter Agreement, no monies would be owed by Russell to PRP, and no
payments were to be made to PRP, until after the first 19-20 lots had been finally sold to home
buyers.
9.

On June 22, 1998, PRP recorded a "Notice of Interest" as to all but 10 of the

72 lots, including lots which had not been closed by Russell or Russell/Packard, and other lots
which had been sold to homeowners. This Notice of Interest states that PRP claims an
unspecified interest in these properties pursuant to the original purchase contract which had
been fully conveyed to Russell, and pursuant to the Purchase and Development Agreement.
See Exhibit 5.
10.

PRP's Notice of Interest has been filed against these properties without any

authorization or authority granted in any documyent or by any law. None of the owners of

2

Indeed, it now appears that substantial additional claims may exist. See Affidavit of
Lawrence M. Russell, ^6.
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properties affected by the Notice has conveyed to PRP an interest in the property. See
Declarations of Petitioners attached as Exhibits 6 through 8.
ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7, petitioners are authorized to seek an order from
this court nullifying the wrongful lien filed by Respondents in the form of a Notice of Interest.
The statute requires that petitioners state with specificity the claim that the lien is a wrongful
lien, and support this claim with an affidavit from the holder of an interest in the property
subject to the wrongful lien.
1.

Respondent's "Notice of Claim" Constitutes a Wrongful Lien Pursuant to
§38-9-1(6).
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6) provides as follows:
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is
recorded or filed is not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute;
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction in the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the
real property. x
Respondents' Notice of Claim is not purported to be based on either (a) or (b) above,

as the Notice states, on its face, that it is based only upon "an agreement dated April 2, 1997,
and a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated November 5, 1996, and November 8, 1996, copies
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of which are attached" to the Notice. The "agreement" referred to is the Purchase and
Development Agreement which is explained at 13 above, and is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
The "Uniform Real Estate Contract" referred to is the contract for the sale of the Saratoga
Springs properties which is explained at \1 above, and is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. Neither
of these documents provides any basis for Respondents to file a notice of interest in the
Saratoga Springs properties.
With regard to the properties owned by Saratoga Springs Development, L.C., and
Merlin and Margie Smith, Respondents have no claim to any interest, due to the simple fact
that the documents cited in the Notice of Claim do not in any way purport to be "signed by or
authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real property," as required by
Utah Code Ann. \ 38-9-1 (6)(c).
With regard to those properties currently owned by Lawrence Russell and/or
Russell/Packard, neither of the two cited documents purport to authorize Respondents to file
their Notice of Interest.
(a)

The Uniform Real Estate Contract. Under the clear terms of the Purchase

and Development Agreement, which Respondents also rely upon, Respondents have
transferred all interest in the "Uniform Real Estate Contract" for the Saratoga Springs
properties to Lawrence Russell. The Agreement provides specifically that "PRP agrees to
assign to Russell all of its right, title and interest in the Contract and its right to acquire the
Saratoga property," and this agreement has been fully executed. Accordingly, the sales
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contract cannot form a legitimate basis for Respondent's claim of an interest in any of the
properties.
(b)

The Purchase and Development Agreement. The Purchase and Development

Agreement cannot form the basis for Respondents' claim of interest, since this document does
not of itself constitute or purport to create an interest in property. Rather, the document
provides for a transfer of Respondents' interests in the contract to purchase the properties.
Although the Agreement states that sums owed to PRP may be secured by a trust deed,
to be recorded only following the closing of a construction loan (and therefore purchase of the
property) by Russell/Packard, such does not in any way constitute an authorization for
Respondents to record an unspecified "claim" against the individual properties in the
development. The Purchase and Development Agreement does not itself purport to create any
property rights, and only constitutes an agreement that Respondent may cause a document (a
trust deed) to be executed which would then create an interest in certain of the properties,
under certain conditions. Respondents have not at any time caused a trust deed to be executed
by Lawrence Russell or Russell/Packard and recorded on specific properties following the
closing of a construction loan in order to secure amounts due and owing to PRP, and this is the
only right which the Agreement purports to grant to PRP.
This is an important distinction. Under the Purchase and Development Agreement,
PRP would only have a right to have a trust deed executed when a construction loan has
already closed on a property as to which Russell/Packard owes an $8,000 payment. The
Agreement itself excludes the first six properties sold, and an additional 13-14 properties are to
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be excluded pursuant to the terms of the Letter Agreement cited above, at \1. Respondents
have excluded from their notice only ten of the Saratoga Springs properties, and there is no
logic to this exclusion, since the Notice of Claim applies to properties not yet owned by
Russell/Packard, and to properties which have been transferred to home buyers. Thus, it is
apparent that the procedure set out in the Agreement is very important; PRP is only given the
right to seek a trust deed, and such would only be executed by Russell/Packard if it is agreed
both that there are "amounts due" under the agreement, and that a specific property should be
subject to a trust deed under the Agreement. The Agreement does not in any way authorize
what Respondent has done, which is to file a broad claim of an unspecified interest in nearly
all of the Saratoga Springs Properties, regardless of whether PRP is currently owed any money
by Russell/Packard for the properties, and regardless of the identity of the actual owners of the
properties at the time.
2.

The Court Should Declare the Notice of Claim to Be Invalid, and Award Fees and
Costs to Petitioner,
Utah Code Ann. ^38-9-7(5)(a) authorizes the Court to issue an order declaring the

wrongful lien void ab initio, releasing the property from the lien and to award costs and
reasonable attorney's fees to the Petitioner. Petitioners request that the Court issue such an
order, and set a hearing within ten days to resolve this issue.
Dated this I [) day of July, 1998.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By:

a^h-yiky^
Klithael R. Carlston
Scott Keith Wilson
Attorneys for Petitioners
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P I ^^ R _ R U S S ELL/PACKARD,

'.

L.C.

We, the undersigned do hereby adopt the following Articles
of Organization for the purpose of forming a Utah Limited Liability Company, to wit:
1.

Name. The name of the Company shall be PREMIER-PJJSSELL/"

PACKARD, L.C.
2.

Duration.

The Company shall continue until terminated

as provided in the Operating Agreement.
3.

Business Purpose.

The business purpose for which the

Company is organized is to prepare and record a final tract map
with respect to "certain property located in Salt Lake County,
Utah, to install required off tract and off-site street and
utility improvements and construct and sell single family residences to the general public and to engage in any other lawful
activity relating to the above purposes.
4.

Registered Aaent. The Company shall continuously

maintain an agent in the State of Utah for service of process who
is an individual residing in said state.

The name and street

address of the initial registered agent shall be J. Craig Carman,
311 South State Street, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. -m\
••

"

ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT:^?:
J^Craig Carman
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•• .-•.v^Sfe:--

The Director of the Division of Corporations and Commercial
Code of the Department of Commerce for the State of Utah is
appointed the registered agent of the Company for service of
process if the registered agent has resigned, the registered
agent's authority has been revoked, or the registered agent
cannot be found or served with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
5.

Members. The names and street addresses of the indi-

viduals ("Members") who shall constitute the initial Members of
the Company are as follows:
Premier Homes, L.C.
7069 Highland Drive, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Russell/Packard Development, Inc.
9007 Arrow Route, Suite 280
Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730
6. Management.

The Company shall be managed by its Members

pursuant to the terms of the Operating Agreement, or any amendments thereto.
7.

Records. The Company shall keep at its principal place

of business all records required to be maintained by the Company
pursuant to Section 48-2b-119 of the Utah Code Annotated, which
records include, but are not limited to, the following:
7.1

A current list in alphabetical order of the names
and last known business street addresses of each
member.

7.2

A copy of the stamped articles of organization and
all certificates of amendment thereto.
-2-
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7.3

Copies of all tax returns and financial statements
of the Company for the past 3 years.

8.

Contributions.

No member shall-be obligated to make any

contribution to the Company except those specifically set forth
in the Operating Agreement adopted by the Members of the Company.
9.

Dissolution.

This Company shall be dissolved as provid-

ed in the Operating Agreement.
10.

Annual Report. The Company shall file all annual

reports required by Utah law during the month of its anniversary
date of formation as required by Section 48-2b-120, Utah Code
Annotated.
11.

Amendments. The Articles of Organization shall be

amended from time to time as required by Section 43-2b-121, Utah
Code Annotated.
12.

Operating Agreement. The Members shall enter into an

operating agreement which shall set forth additional terms and
conditions relating to the management, operation and ownership of
the Company.
13.

Signatures.

All Members of the Company shall sign

these Articles of Organization.
DATED this QJ sfday of February, 1994.
R u s s e l l / P a c k a q d Development,
Inc.

Premi

v

: (.f-^Cdl-t-RtrsSeTl,
c\<j Lawrence
President
C*r*r

John J. Thomas, Member
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FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION
OF

5:

^-3
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PREMIER-RUSSELL/PACKARD, L.C,
We, t h e undersigned, being a l l of t h e members of FrejL|r-:g
R u s s e l l / P a c k a r d , L.C. t o hereby amend our A r t i c l e s of Organza^
t i o n as follows:
A. Amendment. Paragraph 1 of the Articles of Organization
is amended in its entirety to read as follows:
J£ajae. The name of the company shall be PH? Development , L.C.
B. Ratification. Except for the amendment set forth above,
the Articles of Organization previously filed for this limited
liability company are hereby ratified, affirmed and approved.
Dated this

of October, 1994.
PREMIER

Scat* of Utah
r%. t i
Oeparjr.tn* cf Conuncrc*
DMilon c/ Carporatfonj and Canvr.trdal Cxi*
I Strwy csrfjy &»r the fcrejolnj fc» b*-n fife*
>fKi»cpfov<d on l h e 2 3 day ol>^Mf ",T*

2
11 Dlv,,ton
IHt
? ° ^ " °'L*
« d nl^oy GIS7
thli CirJflcati
thor-^

E»™}n«r

.DJ,fizjj#/ & L ^ l*L~
wrence M. Russell, President
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EAUHCTT MOMCY WECOFT
Tne Buyer
» N . f •
\J0.l4?J&0^^
'
olfersio ourenese me Property described below and driver*
to average, aa £gnwa( Moory Dapoai f £[*/***
. / ^ S in ma term of - SZ hg£.t^
JTity
hfU uM\'j
<u IK < e p a M f
m uxuu sem mae aa,i nftu a •iiejaejM III 'III! UWw it pastiest i j all earatt.
£>5S» f%3.
>
(I(Date)
^ ^ ^

Recerved by
xMUfi

Phone Number

/

1. PROPERTY:
C*y
/ jg h i
County
C W q ^
~
UtahV
i i included nems unless excluded nwrein, mis sale shall induce ill fixtures pi seen*/ attached to me Ihoperty: plumbing, r>«at.ng. air-conditioning and
venting fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances. Ilgm flxturaa and butos. bathroom fixtures, curtains and drapers and rods, window and
ooo< screens, norm toon, window bllnda. ewnJnga,fcetsiiadtoJevlaionantenna, seseilrte dishes, and system, walt-to-walt carpets, automatic garage door
opener and transmrawts}. fencing, *eee and ehrube Thetofloenngpersonal property tneu e*eo ba included m tut sale and conveyed under separate Bill of
Saie wrtr warnnv«s ax a n c - ^ r * ^fr^r^irrM
jfr /
—
12 Excluded Itom*. The Hollowing item* ere excludedfrom(Ma aaJt
___—_____^____—
2. PURCMA*£ P*lC£ AMO FnUMClMO. Buyer eg/see ID pay for tha Property at loHo-rc
S Xfrtn,rr)
EaraaallBOfvjyOeaaail
S
tddrang Loan: fiuyar agrees to assume and pay an existing loan n «hia approximate amount presensy parable at c
par month including principal, mvereei (puaaiBj as
% par annumL C real estate taxes. 2 prooerry insurance premium
•na 2 mortgage msurance prernarfn. Buyer agraae B pay any trartassr and asaumpuon feat Seller 2 mat! 2 shall not ba
re*eaaed from BaNMty on seid loan. Any not difference* between the approximate balance of the loan snow* above *na the actual
balance A Caaaeaj anal be adjusted In 3 Cash 3 O t a *
S
Piomot H a Maw Leerc Buyer raoariaa the righttoapply tor any oftoefollowing loans under tne terms oescfbed below.
GCcmvanoonal 3 FHA 3 V A O D t a r
Seller agrees to pay $
toward
Dtacount Points and Buyer** other loan and dosing coaavtobe allocated at Buyer's eacreton.
3 'or a fixed rase loan: Amorvxed and payable over
yean, interest shad not exceed
H per annum, monthly principal and
mwwi payment ahafl not exceed S _ _ _ _ _ . or
3 Por an Adjustable P«t»fceongega(ARM). Amortized and payable over
yean: mrua! interest rate shaH net exceed
H par
annum; WoeJ morrmiy principal and irtfetreal payments analt not exceed S
Maximum Lrte Time mtereal rate shall not
exceed _
% per annum.
S
Seeer F^endng: (See attached Seaar Fmanong Addendum)
S.
S^/^^^lia.riafF^rh-iai^^inCaaeataDi^g
2 ^ Exwang/itew Lean AaaHcaoea. Buyer agree* to make appdcanon tor a loan specified aoove within ^0";a>enda' days (Application Data) after
Accrptanoe. Buyer wffl have made Lean Aaa^eaaan onty whan Buyer has: \M) oomptoted. signed, and detivered to tr>t Lender the mmaJ loan appticaton and
oocumetnroon rmamm^ by the Lender, and (a) pe<d at toen application teat as radulrad by via Lender Buyer will continue to sn>nde me Lender w.tn »ny
addmonal documemxnon aa required by the Lender. IL e*thm aevan calendar days after receipt of written reouest from Se^e*. Buyer ta*b to provide to Seller
wma»nevoenoty>ag Buyer haarnaoeLaaaAaaejctaeitD^
by providing wrtaen nchce to Buyer. The Broaerag*. upon receipt of a copy of such wrrtten notice, shall release to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept aa
Se«e* s exciusn^e remedy, the Eataeet Meaey Dauiefl wrthocrt the reouiremant of any further wntfeen automation from Buyer.
, M
2 2 QmEficesoii Buyer and the Pu»MrtJ rnwat Quairfy for a bantorwhich appiicsBon has been made under taction 2 1 wimm / 7 / n T calendar days
(Qua«ftci*an Oata) $t+r Arc i earnca The Pruyortr a deemed quaimad H. on or before the OuaBfcctfcon Datt. the Property, m its current condraon and tor
t.*>e Buyer i irnended ca«. has appralsad at a velue not iaaa than the Total Purchase Price. Buyer is deemed Qualified it. on or o«*ore me Ouaie^cauen Otic,
me Lender vermea m wnang ttet Buyer haa bean approved aa of tha ve/tflc**on data
22 QMiHceaon CavrMngency. ft Seller haa not pravioua+y vo*ded 9n» Caweawt as provided in Section 21. and either me Property or Buyer nastarfeoto
dual;*/ on o' belor* me »iaaV.eticn Data, erthar parly may cancel thit Corrtrad by providing wntien noccr to me otner party ««MI mree caienda' days
sr*^r rne Ouaa^caaoa De«a. oeNerwiee Buyer and the Pupaitj are deemed oueMfied. The Bn>aeraoa. ue©« nece»pt o* a copy o» such wrmen notice, snaft
return to Buyer rw Umm* lioavy Dipsat wahout t>a raotiramant of any fcrew wrman auff<onzaaon of Setter
1 CLOSINa Tms manaacnon ahal be doaed on or batom ^ f AJ4A*rL**i
^at (
Ooalng shall occur when (a) Buyer and Saltan ha»e
sig'^ed and de;^eredtoeach olher (or to tha eacrow/tit^ oompa^y^
and oy aopiicaofe arer and fb) ma moo*$ required to be paid under these docur*»ent*, rmrt bteo demrered to the escrow/sue company m the form o<
carter's checs. co«aciad or clea/ad funds. SeAer a ^
m vrrbng Taxes and aaaeaamantstorthe current y—e. rents, and mtorest on assumed aofigaaons shall ba prorated aa sat torm >n mis Section Unearned
deposits on tonanc«a snafl be eaneJerredtoBuyer at Caeataf. Pioreeona aet forw m VMS Secuon, shall be made as of -*Gto\t of Oeeing 3 date of
ooaaeiMon Pother _
/
4. POSSCSS>0eL 'Jreesa od^erwiaa agreed m whtng by tha parses. Seaar snail oatfvar p n s f ti on to Buye» w,m,n e ^ /
hqun after Ooaing.
i. CONn»Hia.TTOH O* AQOlCY WSCUa«Uf«. At t h e 1 a m of eaa Caaeaet ma bating agent
1
.
.Represents
C Seller 3 Buyer, and the sefing agent ****{/
(^^f^^f^
repfeeamsj^Saf^jT&^er BuyeAf^O Seder confirm that prior to signing this
Cantrsct wn**n dqctoaure of the agancy rela*onshippJf was provtoedtohim/r>er.n-4^fllyer's inttars <\jC
) Seller s imuaJs
m-rmr^m.

. • • — >, . »p ^ ^ p |
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general warranty deed, ^ee of fmanciat ericufnbranoaa aa warrarrted under Sectfontffo; fb) Setter egncea to pay tor and furnrsh Buyer at OeaJng w>m M
current canaerd form owner's poaey of We ineurance m the amount of me Tesal Purcheee Pivor. (c) the Me poucy snail conform «im Seller's ooi^ahom
wwr subseceons fa) and fb) above, Unless otherartaa agreed under aubeecoon 1.4. the eommrtment ahao eontorm «itn the bt»e »nsurance commitment
provided under Secraon 7.
t ^
7. SELLER OOCiOtURfS. NO tator than
hlA—
calendar days *m Aecaeaeaea Saner wtf de%ver to Buyer the following Se«er Disclosures (a)
a Sexier proper corio^ecmdu^toeure lor tr^ Pi e^arry. a
6 aobeasuedbymetrtK insurance company choeen oy Seaar. erdudrng copree of aH documents Waled as Exceptions on me Convnnment (c) a copy of a*
toen documents reawng » anytoannow axJaang which wtf ancumaertto Pveperty aeaar Cinema, and (d)a copy o« a« leases aeecong the Praeerty not
exp**>g prtorjoDeatoaj Seaar agreastopay any tee cornrravwent eanoeltoeon charge %jn6m s*ibeecaon (0)
t.GfJ^f<AlCOvma|Qp<aa^maeaejo»itoO
referenced rfiSect^n 7 apova: and (b) 3 a^^r^s^^TecttoBuyeria^oroveiot an m p e c w ot t ^ r^ s M rT| The .napecton sne'i be p»d for by Buyer
and shao be conductod by an indMduat /company of Buyerscho«e.Seoaregre«tofuilycooeavatowima
vnoer Sacfton 11 end io m*m ma P upwli avaaafiittortie same.
H Buyer anal he«e llljfa****
days aAar t\i
n m wtach s» ravwjw ma content of Seller O«cio»wrev and. A ** *npectK>n com>ngency
appliestoce-mtvesi end ivaluata 9 M tnapecaori of the Properly, and » oeaemune, *. m Buyers soat dracreeon. tne coment of M Seeer Disclosures
(including me Proparty inapecoonj a accasaatat,
12 if Buyer does not OafWar a wnttan oOfecoon to Seaar re^e^tigt Setter Oiscfoaure or the Pro
above, mat oocumant or tapacaon wet be deemed approved or waived by Buyer.
t3rta^n^ee^ecax>Buyarai»JSaaerahaflranaisa^^
be reoumsdto.reeo*«e Buyer's oOfecSona a Buyer's otaacstone ere not resonred wtmm e * a
* W a P n / ^ t t C t " S * - t f "**'" ** mim * * * * P** 1 "* 1 ' **** T n * •'"bavarega. upon racaapt of a copy of Buyer a wr«*« nouce. snail return c Buyer me
^rw^^>i^w^f^^^^,l,>0^,^f^^u>r^*,l^
»»v*Canwe«tar^*o^edbyBuyeT.8Vn<r»oo»ecaonrs
***** to na»e bean aalvea However, fas weaver dees not aflbel «ieaa aama warmnejd m Seceon t l .
raiaaiaJp^g^ia, llfS~ fa Is
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10. SELLER'S U M T O D WAARAJf
Jailer's warrant** to Buyer rwg»/d»ng me coodibon of the Pteperty - - limited to me following
10 : rvnen untr *atrv«ni pntatMiun of «*e Pioportf to Buyer, ft ww. be broom-clean ano tree of debnt and personal b*ioogi»9S.
10 ? S*<iar wai oe*ver poaeeaeion of rw; Putarty to Buyer wtth the plumbing, piurnoed flrtwa*. Netting. cooing. *rntilating. electrical and sprinkler
iv%K^», «ppii«nc«i end fireplace* m working order,
1C 3 Sailer wil deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the roof and foundation free of leaks known to Seller.
10 4 Sailer w4\ derive* po
on of me Property to Buyer wtth any pnvue well or eepbc tank sarvmg the Property m working order and m compliance
with sovw/rvnerrtaf regutebona:
^0 5 Setter «iD be reapontipie for repairing any of Better's movfog-reiaaad damage to me Property.
10.6 At CloeJng. Seller wUl bring current ail financial obAgaiona encumbering the Property which are assumed m writing sy Buyer and wtH discharge alt
such ooiigatona wr*en Buyer haa not to torn aw art and
^0 7 As of Clnewig. Setter haa no knowledge of any claim or notice of an anvlronmentel. bunding or ionm; code violation regarding the Property which
has not been reeoived.
11. VfJMPICA'nON O f WAJtPuUtTED AHO MCLUOCD (TEMt. Before CTawteg. Buyer may conduct a "walk-through" inspection of me Property to
dettrmine wfwmer or not items warranted by Setter in Section 10.1.10.2. 10.3 and 10.4 ere in me warranted condition and to ver rfy items included m Section
1 i art preeentty on me Pieperty. If any hem la not in me wo* rented condition. Setter wilt correct repair or replace rt as necessary or. with me consent of
Buyer, escrow an amount af O o o M f to provide tor auch repeir or replacement The Buyer's faiKire to conduct a *wark-mrougn" inspection, or to claim
during me "wak-mrovgn" 'wapecbon thai the Pi up artj ooea not include aB hems referenced in Section 1.1. or is not in me condition warranted in Section
'0. wart not conathute a warrer by Buyer of Buyer's righto under Secbon 1.1 or of the w*rranoes contained In Seeaon 10.
12-OlAJtaU0U*iaiflTlUlllACT
aitert&ons or ^provomona to me Property shall be made or vrndertaken without the wrmen corteent of me Buyer.
13. AUTHORITY O f DCMEHS. If Buyer or Sewer m a corporation, partnersh*). trust, estate or omer entity, me person eiacubng this C o n r a d on its benaff
warrants his or her authority to do ao and to bind Buyer or Setter.
u . COMPLETE COemiACT. This lruarumwnt togemer wtm ita addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures constitute me entire Contract
betwaan v * par*** and supersod— and repieeea any and afl prior rwootesoro. represwnucaOfW. wa/ranbes. understanding* or contract* between the
partres. Thit Caetmit cannot be changed except by wrftkan agreement of the pa/bee.
IS. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The p*/*ea agree met arty dispute or daim rotating to f h * Contract including but not limnedtome disposition of me Earnest
Money Dipsetl lha breach or termination of ttie C w n a i t. or me services relating to this traneeeaon. shadfirstbe submroed to mediation in accordance
wrth the Utah Reel Estate Buyer/Setter Medtaoon ftuiea of the Amertcan Arbitration Association. Disputes snail tnchjde representations made by me
C* rt>e* »Ay Broker or crmer person or erw^ In con
pertains, including wrthout llmnvfleA aJteoaflone of concoaamont rwaiepreaentabon, negligence and/ or fraud Each party agrees to bear its own costs of
mediation. Any agreement signed by the parses pursuant to the medlaaon aftaJI be binding if meombon %•*. the procedures applicable and remedies
available under this Contract ehajl apply. Nothing in mm Secton 15 aneJ prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation. By
marking mrs box O . and aotfng their inrfeers, the Buyer (
),andmeSe4er(
J, agree mat mediation under m«s S e o o n 15 is not mandatory, but is
optional upon agreement of all pe/bea.
H . Of FAULT, ff Buyer deeauHa. Setter may etectto either netom the larweet aieney Oepwait es iiquttfeted damages or to return me Earnest Money Oopee*
ane sue Buyer» eriforca SeMe/a n^nss.ffSeeejr o^ewMJls« in addrtto^
iiquioated damages, a turn equal to me Earnest feeney DepeeJL or to sue Saner tor apecmc peftormanee and/or damages R Buyer elects to accept the
liquidated damages. Setter agree* to pey the liquidated damage* to Buyer upon demand Where a Section of this Contract provrpes a apecmc remedy ma
parties intend mat me remedy eneJt be exctuarve ragarrflaea of rtghto which might otherwise be available unoer common law.
17. AnOftMETS FEES. >n any acbon artamg out of met Contract the prevailing party shad be erttfled to coss and reasonable attorney's fees
11. DtSPOSmOM O f EAAMEST MOMEY. The Eameet Mwney 0 tonal shaft not be reieaaed unlets it >s aumonzed by: (a) Section 2. Section 6 3 or Section
IS: ft) seoarast wrtatn ag/eement of me perbes. or (d court order.
11. AtKOCAT)0»t Except for expreas warrarrbet maoe m ttta Canaract, the pro»ieioris of mrs Contract snail no*, appry iter Qoamg
20. ASX Of LOSS. Ail nek of loaa or damage to me Property shaJ be borne by Setter until Qoetng.
2t. H U E rs Of THE S O O f C g . Time is of the eaaenca regarding me dels* set form m mrs transacbon Extensions must be agreed to w> wncng by an parties
b«r*ormance under aacn Seceon of mrs Ceieln.1 wrecfi refeiencea a dtto anail be required absolutely by S.-00 PU Mountain Time on the statad arte
21. FAC3IMTLE (f AJQ DOCUMENTS. Feceurale transmtaaion of any ttgned onginai oocument, anq retransmission of any signed facsimile transmission,
snail be the same as delivery of an ongmet. H the tranaacbon Irtvorvea muibpie Buyenj or Set wrs. hjcs<mite transmissions may be executed in counterparts
23. ACCEPTAIfCS. Axcepianue occvra when Seller or Buyer, respondingtoan offer or counteroffer of me other (a) s*gns :ne offer or counter wher t noted
to indicate azcepancr. and (b) comrnvncaees to me other party or me other party's agent mat me oner or counteroffer has been signed as required.
2^0FFER AWO TIME FOPJ ACCCPTAMOL Buyer offers to purenaae me Property on me above terms and condioors K Sei»er does not accept trus offer &y
. mrs offer shall Upsa; and the Brocerage shaU return me Eameet Money

{Buyers Sgnatirej (/&r**uSlj*<\j*~*±£CS'(Offer

(One/Data)

Oen)
(Buyer's Sgnature)
T ^ a b o v e data enail be me Owar Reference D<
Oe«e.

(Nobce Aooresal

(Phone)

(Nobce Addreee)

(Phone)

^ ^
ACC^rnAMCE/RaUKTIOM/COUKrrCR OfFEU
CHKX^O^t
g^oeepjMfce^OwartoPyreiiojwrSwite/
^Aoeep4arica fi Owarto)Pia ufuaia. Seuer lIccapH
u a p t a me fxpgotng ofsar on the bjrrn* and oonditrons specified above.

IH2L_

^k

(SeiwrsSigyvaaW \

(Oejaf

(Oasat

(Time)

(SeAer's Signature)

(Data)

(Time)

me term* of Buyer's ofler abject to the execpuona or rnodiBcabont as specrhed m me attached

^»L^HKjutnwBroe*rtofurnie*B^

(One of me toilow^g ahemehves must mefetore

C o i n e d haartng
bear
receipt of a SrtoJ copy of me tonagotng) Cortm^t
a# Mc/iasuree;
. \

\

ssoMATuec Of

BaipenwwJycauatdafaWcopycJtr^
oeraeed Mai and raaum nsceejt ttoachedI hereto
to me Q
heretoa>me
D Sewer.
J e M . DOB Buyer,
u y e r , Sere
Sen* by .

^

'°- J ¥^—

BUTW

_ ^ _
TX?£*

. t«

^

i^i-JgJptLiiJcJs.*
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ADDENDUM #1
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
Byreference,this is an ADDENDUM to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with an
Offer Reference Date of August 14, 1996, including all addenda and counter offers, between P.R.P Development,
Inc., as Buyer and ( i . U . T Wgsnifrra*
., as Seller on property known as: "Saratoga
Springs No. 1" Subdivision, Lehi^Iity, UT. (72 fully improved town home building lots).
The following terms are hereby incofporatod as pan of the REPC, and to the extent these terms modify or conflia
with any provisions of the REPC, these terms shall control All other terms of the REPC not modified shall remain
the same:
1.

Buyer to cloee on any 9 lots within 30 days from time that a building permit can be obtained from
pertinent city and all improvements are installed including but not limited to pavement.

2.

Buyer to does on any 9 lots every 90 days thereafter until all lots are closed

3.

At dosing Buyer will close 9 lots X $30,000.00 * $270,000.00. This will release nine (9) lots.

4.

Seller's release of lots will be determined at Buyer and Seller's discretion, prior to closing

5.

No let to be dosed on prior to any and all improvements being installed, including pavement and a
building permit being obtainable from pertinent city.

6.

All construction debris on all lots to be removed by Seller prior to closing on each lot.

7.

Seller to approve Buyer's site plan, architectural plan, elevations and exterior materials. Buyer
understands that be will be responsibleforall costs related to any changes to she plan if changes are
required tofitBuyer's home pians.
NOTE: Some principals, managers anchor employees of buyer are licensed real estaie agents or brokers
with the State of Utah.

( ) Buyer ( X ) Seller shall have until 5:00 ( ) am ( X ) PM Mountain Time, November 8, 1996 to accept these
terms. Unless so accepted, this offer shall lapse.

ACCEPTANCE / REJECTION / COUNTER OFFER
(-0 Seller ( ) Buyer hereby accepts these terms.

„.

X\

jikk* —

( ) Buyer v _ (/) Seller Signature
( ) Rejection: ( ) SeDer ( ) Buyer rejects these terms.

DaS*

(Initials)
(Date)
( ) CouxterOffcr. ( ) Seller ( ) B19W presents as a counter offer the terms set forth on the attached Counter
Offer*
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WATERMAMK ON REVERSE SIDE MiSSUH> FEATURE INDICATES A CCPV

PURCHASE AND DEVELOPMEiNT AGREEMENT

This Purchase and Development Agreement ("Agreement") is made and entered into this
3^ day of April, 1997 by and between PRP Development, LC ("PRP"), a Utah Limited Liability
Company, Russell-Packard Development, Inc. ("RPI"), a California Corporation, Premier Homes
Construction, LC. ("Premier"), a Utah Corporation and Lawrence M. Russell ("Russell").
Premier Homes, LC and Premier Homes Construction, LC are two separate entities.
0

RECITALS
WHEREAS, Russell and Premier Homes, LC are the sole members of PRP, and
WHEREAS, Russell desires to sell all of hisright,title and interest in PRP to Premier on
the terms and conditions set forth herein, and
WHEREAS, Russell desires therightto acquirefromPRP Lots 1 to 72 in the Saratoga
Springs Subdivision, Phase 1 located in Utah County, Utah (said lots are hereinafter collectively
referred to the "Saratoga Property"and the individual lots are referred to as the "Lots") pursuant
to the terms of a real estate purchase contract ("Contract") signed by PRP on November 5,1996
and signed by CMT Investments as Seller on November 8,1996 which Contract names PRP as
Buyer, and
WHEREAS, Russell is willing to pay PRP to acquire said Property.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the covenants and promises set forth herein, the
parties murually agree as follows:
1.

Purchase of Interest in PRP. Premier agrees to pay and Russell agrees to accept the sum
of S5,000 for Russell's remaining interest in PRP. Russell shall transfer it's interest in PRP
to Premier at the time of closing. Premier shall pay Russell the purchase price at the time
of closing. The parties represent that the purchase prices set forth herein represents a fair
estimate of the value of Russell's remaining interest in PRP as of the date hereof.

2.

Saratoga Property. PRP agrees to assign to Russell all of itsright,title and interest in the
Contract and itsrightto acquire the Saratoga Property at the time of closing. Russell
agrees to ray PRP the sum of $528,000 for PRP's interest in the Saratoga Property. Said
sum shall be paid as follows:
a.

Russell shall pay PRP the sum of 58,000 for each Lot on 66 Lots of the Saratoga
Property. In such an event, Russell shall be entitled to sell the first 6 lots without
making any payment to PRP. On the last 66 lots, Russell shall pay PRP the sum of

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

$8,000 at the time of closing of the sale of each Lot. No interest shall accrue on
the unpaid balance.
b.

In the event Russell sells, assigns or transfers the Saratoga Property other than
through the sale of an individual Lot, the amounts due PRP shall become due and
payable upon such in such event.

c.

The amounts due PRP shall be secured by a standard trust deed and trust deed
note in favor of PRP to be recorded after the closing of the construction loan
and/or an escrow arrangment at American Legal Title, acceptable to PRP, which
arrangment provides for the payment of 58,000 to PRP upon the sale of each Lot.

d.

Russell shall have until April 1,1999 to pay the principal sum of S528,000 at no
interest. Interest shall accrue after April 1,1999 at the rate of 8 percent per annum
on the unpaid principal balance. After April 1,2000, the principal sum, together
with all accrued interest, shall become due and payable

3.

Disclaimer of Interest. As a material part of the consideration of this Agreement, Russell
and RPI acknowledge and agree that upon the consummation of the transaction set forth
in this Agreement, neither Russell nor RPI shall have any further interest in and to PRP or
any of its assets, projects or properties.

4.

Notice. All demands and notices to be given hereunder, if any, shall be personally
delivered or sent by registered mail addressed to the respective parties at their postal
addresses as of the date of this Agreement or to such other address as each may hereafter
designate in writing.

5.

Successors. Except as otherwise provided herein, this Agreement shall be binding upon
and inure to the benefit of the respective parties hereto, their legal representatives,
successors and assigns.

6.

Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding
between the parties hereto and supersedes all prior agreements or understandings.

7.

Amendment. This Agreement may not be altered or amended except by a subsequent
written agreement executed by all of the parties hereto.

8.

Attorney's fees. In the event of any controversy or claim or dispute between the parties
hereto arising out of or relating to this Agreement or any of the documents provided for
herein, or the breach thereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the
losing party reasonable attorneys1 fees, expenses and costs, whether incurred prior to,
during or subsequent to trial including appeals.

i
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Additional Documents. The parties hereto agree to execute such additional documents as
may be necessary or desirable to cany out the intent of this Agreement.
Nonwaiver. The failure of any party to enforce the provisions of this Agreement shall not
constitute a waiver unless specifically stated in writing, signed by the party whose rights
are deemed waived, regardless of a party's knowledge of a breach hereunder.
Governing Law. The terms of the Agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with Utah law. The parties agree that any legal proceedings relating to the
subject matter of this Agreement shall be brought exclusively in the Stae of Utah. The
parties represent to each other that the Agreement to bring legal proceedings exclusively
in the State of Utah will not place a serious inconvenience or be unfair or unreasonable to
any of the parties hereto. Because the State of Utah has a substantial relationship to both
the parties and this transaction, it is appropriate to select the Utah Courts to handle any
and all legal proceedings relating hereto.
Severability. If any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be declared invalid
by a court, agency, commission or other tribunal or entity having jurisdiction thereof, the
application of such provisions to parties or circumstances other than those as to which it is
held invalid or unenforceable shall not be affected therebv, and each of them not so
declared invalid or unenforceable shall be valid and be enforced to the fullest extent
permitted by law and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be reasonable terms
consistent with the undertakings of the parties under this Agreement has been substituted
in place of the invalid provision.
Paragraph Headings. Paragraph headings in this Agreement are for convenience only and
shall not be deemed to modify, interpret or limit the provisions hereof.
Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of
which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall be deemed to be one and
the same instrument.
Time of the Essence. Time is of the essence in this Agreement.
Authorization. The individuals who have signed this Agreement represent and warrant
that they are duly authorized to execute this Agreement, in either their individual or
representative capacity as indicated, and that this Agreement is enforceable according to
its terms.
Survival. The provisions, promises, warranties, representations, and covenants set forth
herein shall survive any execution, settlement, delivery or recording of any instrument and
shall not be merged therein.
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18.

Legal Counsel. The parties hereto have engaged the lawfirmof Carman & Associates,
P.C. to prepare this Agreement. All parties acknowledge that they have been advised to
seek independent legal advice to represent their individual interests to the extent they
deem it necessary.

19.

Costs. Each of the parties shall pay their own costs and expenses incurred, or to be
incurred, in negotiating and preparing this Agreement and in closing and carrying out the
transactions contemplated by this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement on the day and year
above written.

PRP Development, LC

fistv

mmber

1ty^ify^ffi/cJ^iM&Hm4s/U

Russell-PackdrcJ/Oevelopment, Inc.

Premier Homes Construction, LC

~M0Sk?&z>

vrence M. Russell

\
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LAW OFFICES
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &

MARTINEAU

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR
POST OFFICE BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5000
TELEPHONE (801) 521-9000
FACSIMILE (801) 36J-0400
.

Scott Keith Wilson

/

^ ^ .

writer's dircci number:

(80i)322-7ii 5

March 2, 1998
J. Craig Carman
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Burton Lumber v. PRP, et al.

Dear Craig:
As we discussed yesterday, I am writing to set out the terms of our proposed settlement
of the lawsuit filed against PRP Development (PRP), John Thomas, and Larry Russell by
Burton Lumber, which arises out of PRP's unpaid account with Burton Lumber, which now
totals $90,009.00. As you know, the amounts owed to Burton Lumber are the debts of PRP,
and any payments made by Larry Russell in order to settle this account must be set off against
amounts payable to PRP under the terms of the Purchase and Development Agreement
executed on April 2, 1987. Although we understand that PRP and John Thomas dispute some
of the charges claimed by Burton Lumber, the total of these disputed amounts is less than
$11,000. Thus, even under PRP's view of the debt, the amount owed is still at least
$79,009.00.
In addition to the Burton Lumber account, Larry Russell has also paid off certain other
debts owed by PRP. These obligations include $12,364.45, arising out of Larry's payoff of
the construction loan for Lot 15, Lake Park Meadows, and $18,800 in lease payments and
mileage penalties arising out of PRP's lease of a 1996 GMC truck.
In light of these listed obligations of PRP and its principals, Larry Russell is willing to
resolve the current litigation with Burton Lumber, provided that these PRP obligations thereby
satisfied are deducted from amounts payable to PRP under the terms of the Purchase and
Development Agreement. These amounts are as follows:
$79,009.00
12,364.45
18.800.00
$110,173.45

Burton Lumber
Lot 15, Lake Park Meadows
GMC truck lease
Total

Larry Russell will be solely responsible for all other lease obligations related to the 1996
GMC truck.
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J. Craig Carman
March 2, 1998
Page 2

Accordingly, $110,173.45 will be deducted from the total amount to be paid to PRP under the
terms of the Purchase and Development Agreement, and no payments will be made to PRP
until the $110,173.45 plus interest at the rate of 8 percent per annum has been fully set off
against the $8,000.00 payments specified by the Purchase and Development Agreement. In
addition, Larry Russell will retain ownership of the GMC truck. The settlement as stated in
this letter resolves only those three debts listed above, and does not waive or affect any other
claims which have arisen or which may arise between Larry Russell and John Thomas, PRP,
its present principals or others. This agreement is conditioned on Larry Russell's complete
settlement of the Burton Lumber litigation and complete release of Larry Russell, John
Thomas, and PRP from said lawsuit.
There is currently a limited window of opportunity for Larry Russell to settle the Burton
Lumber case on PRP's behalf, and so this offer will remain open only until close of business
on Monday, March 2, 1998.
If this agreement is acceptable to you and your clients, please execute this agreement by
signing below as indicated and returning it to me. If you have any questions, please call.
Very truly yours,
SN£W, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Michael R. Carlston
Scott Keith Wilson
Counsel for Lawrence M. Russell
APPROVED AND ACCEPTED:

John J. Thomas, personally and
on behalf of PRP Development, LC

A

J. Craig Carman
Counsel for John J. Thomas and PRP
N:\19598U\SKW\CARM AN2.LTR

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

WL" W i

<?u

WL.^

moi\

TO1,

£w

Iccouii
r •»-

NOTICE OF INTEREST
7

NOTICE OF INTEREST it hereby given ihat PRP Development, L.C., a Ut*h limited
liability company, purauam to an agreement dated April 2. 1997. and a Uniform Real Elate
Contract dated November 5.1996 and November 8, 1996, copiw of each of which are
attached hereto a* Exhibit "A*, claims an Inierwt in and to lots 1.2, 3, 4. 5, 6. H. 9. II.
13. 14. 15. 16, 17. 1$. 19, 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31, 32. 33, 34. 35.
36, 37. 31, 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 4S. 46. 47. 48. 49. SO. SI, 52. 53. 4\54. 5fr. 57. 5S,
it). Ai). 61. 62. 67. 69. 7 0 , 7 1 . of Saratoga Springs Plat A, Plat 4. Sheet 2.'Wanned Unit
Development located in Utah County, Sate of Utah.
DATED this J l _ day of June, 199*.
.NT.

i.e.

John Thomas
STATE OF UTAH

)
;ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
On thit If

day of June. 1998, Wore me the undersigned, a Notary Puhlie In

ucd fur ir.,d County und .Suite, pi*: sunnily appeared John Tlwtn.ii. known to mc ici lie the
Minnjcr of PRi* Development. L t'„ end acknowledged to me that In? executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto set my hand and seal tlte day and year
firn above written.

a

p

N»ury Public far Huh

J&x-
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"•; PURCHASE AM) DEVELOPMENT AGU££MItfT
"-

(:

»4C
T ^ 5 Puichai* and Drvdopaai AgmmerU rAgrctmcat") b &U lad entered into this
#?._ d*y Qf April I W by AA4 bttu*ea PRJ Development, LC f P R P l a Utah Limited Liability
Cwjpmy, RuestU-Packar d Development, be. fR?Di i California C a f c a t i a i Premier Bonus
CottuwdQ^ LC. rPttmler), i Utah Cotpoptt'ofi a d U*rtoet NK R M ' f ' f t u j i e i n .
Prtmie Homo, LC u d Prtmiir Kottei CoAsfeuetioo, LC i n two aepanfc cotitlci.
•

«CtTAL$

WHERBAS, Rusull and Prtakf Homes. LC u* the sole ncirbon of PW\ ind
WHERE AS, Ruueit desire* ic sell ill o/ksright,title *M interest in PR? to Premier on
6 e temu aad conditions setferthherein. Afld
WH£R£A5, Russell desbts i k right to acquire ton PR? Lou I to ?2 in the S i w p
Sprinp Subdivision, Phase I located ft Uuh Connty, Utah (said bis art hereinafter collccdvdy
rtferctd to the u t o a p Propcny^arid the Individual leu v t nfrrred io as the -lots") pursuant
to the tarns of e real aetata purehaw eontnet (uCof\lraci1') signed by PAP on November 5.1996
and lignad by CMT Investments is Seller ©o November i. 1996 which Contract nanus PRP as
Buyer, and

j

VHEREAS, Rvssell b wiilinj to pay PR? ia acquis said PropertyNOW. THEREFORE, in considtntioQ ofthe covenants and promises m forth henin. ike
parties mutually agree * follows:
I<

>urrhai# af t w e ^ f |w »qp Premier agrees la pa* and Ruiwll agrees to accept \h< IUIO
of J 5,000 for Russell's remaining fait rest in PRP. Russell shall transfer tfi interest in PRP
to Premier at the tme of closing Premier shall pay Russell the purchase price at the time
of elajfaj. TTie partlea reptesc&t that ifac purchase prices Ml /tab keira reprefenU a fair
estimate of (he value of Rusaeirs remain!nj imet«t ;n PR? as of the dste hereof.

1

S|fitenhaatffi> PR? i g m s to usigp io Rweli id of iu rithu litfe and Interest in the
Contract and itsrighxto acquire die Saratoga Propcny at the time pfdoiinf. Russell
agrees to pay PRP the sum of J53I.OOO for PHP's iruncn in the Saratoga Property. Said
w n shall he paid ag foil***
a.

Rueaoll shall pay PRP the sura of Jl,000 for ejeh laoa&i Lou of d* Sanioga
Proptrry. to such IA a^enu Ruoiell ihall be entitlii to Mil the fim 6 toU wtihous
making any payment to PR? On the last 66 lou. Russell ahaH pay PR? the sum of
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Ji^OOCutbiuincofcJost^
the unpaid Wnnte.
b.

bthct^iRucaeUMn^uslgAsortriMfo
thfoufh the safeofan iadWdual Ut, (he aoountt d a a ? ! * shall become due and
ptyibk upo& meh la such evtst

e.

The»iouTOdu*?Wshanbeiecwdbyastan^
n o * h bvor of PR?tobe recorded after tbi elou'ng of At coosauetlon loan
aad/ar an escrow anaAgmtntfitAmerican legal Title, acceptable to PRP, which
HTMgmcnt provides for the payment of 53,000 to PR? upon the u k Of each Lou

d.

Russell shall hava until April 1.1999 to pay the principal lum of SS21,000 at no
bucic*. Irterast shall accrue aftar April 1,1999 at the rate of 8 pt/cent p*t annum
o*thi unpaid principal balance. AAer April 1.2000, the principal sum, together
w{\h all accrued interest, dull become due mU poytbla

3.

pftf^)a;w^6ffn^{j[{. A* a materia! pan of the cansldor^tion of this Asrecmru, Ruuill
and RPJ acknowledge and MTTC that apoa the consummation of the transition set forth
in this Agroenxtti, neither RuiMll aor RP1 thai) have any funhcr imaest in and to PRP or
any of ica assets, projects or properties.

4.

Madgg- All demands aod noticestobe given hereunder, if any, shall be personally
delivered or sew by reflttnd null ti4mn& to the respective ponies at their postal
eddrcseas M of vhe date of this Afrtc^nt or to cuchtfharaddrett « each may hmaftsr
designate la urlifnj.

3.

S u r e t y * Excepi at othmMK pr«n idid hereto, this Agreement shall be binding upon
and inure to the benefit of the respective parti* haeio. their legal representatives.
succtiion and assitns.

6.

gtwlfr ^ BTr > mr nf This Ag rccmeni cooitituici the entire ajretoeat ind undersLMdiftf
between the ponies birtco and supersedes all prior agreements or understanding f.

7.

Amtw^fsf. This Agreement may noi be iliered or s/nendtd cttipi by i subsequent
H-urrn agreement cxccuiid br all of (he parties hcietc

I.

Atifl^v^Fgq. \n the e^ent of any controversy or claim or dispute between the panics
hereto arising out of or relatingtothis Agreement w my of Uvt documents provided for
hereto, or the breach thereof, the prcvaflni pony shall be tatitled to recoverfromihe
Ming ptny reasonable aiwicyf 1 free, nqpeuas and eesii, wither locvmd priur lu.
during or cubequcnt to trial including appals.
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9.

AiMitirtmi flftflimrrito Tie part* b e t * apti to aceuu such tddtdoui documents u
s a y be r*cmviry er desirable 10 carry dui At Inwtfoflhii/VffwntaL

10.

NPO^iiiar. T h c f f t i i o M o f ^ M t y t o n t a
eootiliuur a **ivir uolaai «pt&j6elly staled in writing, sipud by ihf pa*Ty ufao* rifhta
arc deemed wiivod, rvgaxdfess of i pair's bUMrddfC of a breach taiuflde/.

It.

gyftrriJrx;jnt> Ttelerntfof(bcA?ecM(>WIfe^
tuoedanc* wfih Utah low. The partial ft£tt A * * y kf11 proceed*** relating to fho
jutyeet macer of ihb Agreement ffcaU bo b&jfebc eaeteivcly \n the State of Uah. The
ponies ttpcJcte 10 tad* other thai (J* Affolsam to bring legal p^ctfdinp exduslvely
IA tin Siatc orUlih will not pfeei a itdoiii fowavwlinci or be unfair or unrcaiooaMa to
any of the parud hereto. Because the Sttie of Utah hoi a substantial ftiationihip to both
tht parties and this tanuedon, if b appropriate K> sejen ch» Utah Courts to handle any
a*l ||| legal proceedings relating hart*.

II

SovgnMHrv. I f u y of Ac trnni and condliloas of ch/i A&reera«Gt jhail bt drfcls/ed invalid
fay a court, age«*y. commission or other tribunal or intiiy having jurisdcifen ihrreoC 0 »
tppJkddoa of Jtidi provisions to panii* or cireumftMCtt other ihan dio*e is tottftjehli Ii
held inveicd or unenforceable shall not hi affected thereby, and tach of ihetn /iot so
declared Invalid or unenforceable stall be voJfrf o^d b* enforced io the fUlcsi cstent
ponnirud by law and ihcrightsAnd obligation of the parties shall be reasonable term*
comiiteni »i(h the undertakings of Ihe parties under this Agreement ha/ ^ « wbiiituted
In piict of the Invalid pravisloo.

13.

Earawish Hg^tprc Panfrdph headings in ih/s Agreemcot arc for cwenie&ee only and
(hall not bodttned to modMy.toietpftior Unit ^ provisions hcrrof.

14.

royft^f^fl^ This Aztttmm mv bo executed in in>%number of soum#rparu. aaoh of
which shall bo doomed an wif tnal, but all of which lojether shall berfetroedto be oni b%i
ih« same tnuxvmtm.

15.

Tim* 9f(,k^ g a t ^ ^ TliD«UofUbfiiiJfU«lAtbii A|re«mrni.

li.

AinKnnM(jfln Tht indivlduais who bavt lipid ihii AfrtOflMnircpftsent an4 ^VTam
thuiho^ i n duiy authoriatd GO Mootat this Afrttmint, In either tht ir Individual or
rt prcienutjve capacity AS iadkaiid, iod ihai AJi Agreemem n tnforeeahie Keordlof to
Its icons.

17.

StfY'yl I V provlsicns, promi^i. wan^nilct, trpr^scnuikrii. And CON tftan IJ $g( forth
htrtto ihall lUfvfvr my cicruiion sculcmcai dwliu-ry o: rcioidinf of an?- Init^umrnt a^d
shall not b# mcrrtd th^rtin

•'SO'd

OSC^ ^22
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